Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

Melvin Laws v. Blanding City : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary B. Ferguson; Williams & Hunt; Attorney for Appellee.
Darwin C. Fisher; Fisher, Scribner, Moody & Stirland; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Laws v. Blanding City, No. 940415 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6065

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

j£l§

MELVIN Li"

WS.

BLANDING

BLE LYLE R. ANDERSON

li in' li i j y g

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MELVIN LAWS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

vs.

:

BLANDING CITY,
Defendant/Appellee.

:
:

Case No.

940415-CA

Argument Priority:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JURY VERDICT FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON

15

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF
ISSUE
ISSUE
ARGUMENT
ISSUE

THE ARGUMENT
1
2
1
I.

6
6
9
13
13

THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S
EXPERT WITNESS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT
PREJUDICED THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE
A.
PLAINTIFF'S DESIGNATION OF ECKOF, PROCTOR
& WATSON AS ITS EXPERT WITNESS IS A
PROPER DESIGNATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
TRIAL COURT'S SCHEDULING ORDER
B.
AN EXPERT WITNESS MUST BE PREPARED WITH
AN
OPINION
AS
OF
THE
DATE
OF
DEPOSITION
C.
WITNESS EXCLUSION SHOULD ONLY BE UTILIZED
AS A SANCTION FOR A WILLFUL NONCOMPLIANCE
OF A COURT ORDER
D.
WITNESS EXCLUSION SHOULD NOT BE UTILIZED
WHERE OTHER OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
COURT
E.
PLAINTIFF'S CASE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE
EXCLUSION
OF
PLAINTIFF'S
EXPERT
WITNESS
F.
DEFENDANT'S
MOTION
IN
LIMINE
WAS
UNTIMELY
G.

DEFENDANT'S CASE WAS NOT PREJUDICED
THE DESIGNATION OF MR. THORPE AS
EXPERT WITNESS

13
16
17
20
22
24

BY
AN

ISSUE 2
INTRODUCTION
I.
INSTRUCTION
#17
WAS
NOT
THE
PROPER
INSTRUCTION
A.
INSTRUCTION #17 IS NOT PROPER BASED ON
THE FACTS OF THE CASE AS REVEALED BY THE
EVIDENCE

ii

13

25
29
29
31

31

B.

II.

INSTRUCTION #17 IS NOT THE CORRECT
APPLICATION
OF
THE
LAW
OF
THE
JURISDICTION
C.
INSTRUCTION #17 APPLIES THE OPEN AND
OBVIOUS
DANGER
RULE,
WHICH
IS
INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS STATE
D.
AN INSTRUCTION ON SECTION 343 OF THE
RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS IS ONLY
PROPER WHEN GIVEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN
INSTRUCTION ON SECTION 343A
PROPER
INSTRUCTION MUST BE FOUNDED ON
TRADITIONAL PREMISES LIABILITY PRINCIPLES. . .
A.
DEFENDANT HAS DUTY TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF
FROM UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS ON
PREMISES
B.
THE JURY INSTRUCTION MUST CORRECTLY STATE
DEFENDANT'S DUTY WITHOUT ABROGATING THIS
STATE'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE SYSTEM. .

33
37

42
45
45
46

CONCLUSION

50

APPENDIX 1

53

APPENDIX 2

54

APPENDIX 3

55

APPENDIX 4

56

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited:
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538 r. ;:rl 175 (Utah 1975)

. .

48

Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291,
184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992) . . 1, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 29
Canfield v. Albertsons, o-i ; P.2d
(Ct.App. 1991)

1224, 200 Utah Adv

Peats v. Commercial Security Bank. 746 P..id llbU,
1987)
Donahue v. Durfee,
(Ct.App.1989)

780

P.2d

1275,

118

Utah

Kep.
.

(Utah Ct.App.
" :
Adv. Rep. b4
34, 35, 37-40

Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980)

1,1

Ellertson V. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978)
English v. Kienke, 848 l..:u IL.J (wt ,-ui 199 ;| . . .

37
i«,

Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co. et al., 232 P. 2d 210. 1
(1951)

•..-.. _>1
40, 49

Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 754
P.2d 89 (Ct.App.1988)
30, 45-48
Hampton v. Rowley Builders Supply, 10 Utah 2d 169, 350 P.2d 151
(1960)
40
Hill v. Dickerson, 839
1992)

P.2d 309, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Ct.App.
28

In re Disciplinary Action of George McCune. 717 P. 2d 701
1986)

(Utah
24

Inner City Wrecking Co. v. Bilskv, 367 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (Ohio App.
1983)
18, 22
Jacobson Constr. Co. V. Strutco-Lite Eng'g, Inc., 619 P.2d 306, 309
(Utah 1980)
39
Jansen v. Lichwa, 474 P.2d 1020 (Ariz.App. 1970)

28

Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 477 (1955)
40
Long v. Smith Food King Store. 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973) . . .
iv

40

Martin
1977)

v.

Safewav

Stores.

Inc. 565

P.2d

1139,

1140-41

(Utah
40,47

Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. . 631 P.2d 865, 870
1981)

(Utah
38

Nickev v. Brown, 454 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio App. 1982)

17

Ohlson v. Safewav Stores, Inc.. 568 P.2d 753 (Utah 1977)

40, 50

Parker V. Highland Park, Inc.. 565 S.W.2d 512, (Tex. 1978)

. 39,
49

Plonkey v. Superior, 475 P.2d 492, 494 (Ariz. 1970)

22

Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co.. 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991)
45
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Company, Inc., 491 P.2d 1209, 26 Utah
2d 448 (1971)
23
Schultz v. Ouintana. 576 P.2d 855 (Utah 1978)
Sexton
1973)

v.

Sugar

Creek

Packing

Co..

29,33

311 N.E.2d

535,538

(Ohio
20

Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta. Inc.,
814 P.2d 623

(Ut.Ct.App.1991)40

Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 862 P.2d 1342 (1993)
Stephenson v. Warner et. al.. 581 P.2d 567 (Utah 1978)
Tias v. Proctor. 591 P.2d 438, (Utah 1979)
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d
1990)
Williams v. Melbv.

699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985)

.
920,

. 1

30, 40
46
(Utah
18
40

Statutes Cited:
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2 (3) (j) (as amended 1953)

1

Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3 (as amended 1953)

1

Utah Code Annotated §78-27-38 (1994)

2, 34

Rules Cited:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 16 (1994)

1, 21

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 30 (1994)

1, 7, 14-16

v

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3) (j) (as amended 1953).
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3 (as amended 1953).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Did the trial court err in excluding the testimony of
Plaintiff's expert witness?

This is a case management decision, and is therefore under
an abuse of discretion standard.

Berrett v. Denver and Rio

Grande Western R.R, Co., 830 P.2d 291, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49
(Ct.App.1992).
B.

Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).

Did the trial court correctly state the law concerning
negligence in instructing the jury?

Challenges to jury instructions are reviewed on a
"correctness" standard.

Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.,

862 P.2d 1342 (1993) .
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
The determinative statutes and rules whose interpretation is
pertinent to this appeal are as follows:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3 0 (1994).

See appendix 1

attached.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 16 (1994).
attached.

1

See appendix 2

Utah Code Annotated §78-27-38 (1994).

See appendix 3

attached.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a civil case, which was commenced in March of 1991
to recover damages sustained by Plaintiff Melvin Laws, who was
injured in a fall from a dumping platform at the Blanding City
Dump.

Plaintiff alleges that the injuries were caused by the

negligence of Blanding City in the construction and maintenance
of the dump, and the lack of safety equipment.
jury demand was filed in November, 1994.

(Rec. at 1-7).

(R. at 10).

In January of 1994, one month prior to trial, Defendant
filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's expert witness.
65).

The motion was granted.

(R. at 413-16).

motion for a new trial which was denied.

(R. at 364

Plaintiff filed

(R. at 453-54).

The case was tried to a jury in February 1994.

Exception

was taken by Plaintiff with the trial court's list of jury
instructions.

(Trial Transcript [Tr.] at 230-31).

court overruled Plaintiff's objection.

The trial

(Tr. at 231).

The jury

returned a verdict in favor of Defendant, finding no negligence
on the part of Defendant.

(Tr. at 269-73).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Plaintiff Melvin Laws lives at 1050 N. 850 W. in

Blanding, Utah.

(Tr. at 11) .
2

2.

On April 28, 1990, Plaintiff went to the Blanding City

Dump to dispose of garbage.
3.

While at the dump, Plaintiff fell down a 30-40 foot

precipice into the dump.
4.

(Tr. at 14-15).

(Tr. at 21).

On the day of the accident, strong winds whipped

through the canyon, and smoke from several small fires in the
dump clouded the sky.
5.

(Tr. at 132-33).

The dump had recently been bulldozed by the Defendant,

creating a 30-40 foot precipice.
6.

A city ordinance requires city residents to subscribe

to a garbage retrieval service.
7.

(Tr. at 141-42).

(Tr. at 151-152).

The city of Blanding does not provide garbage retrieval

for citizens living within the county but outside city limits.
(Tr. at 151-152) .
8.

A special arrangement must be made with a private

contractor for a resident outside city limits to receive garbage
retrieval service.
9.

(Tr. at 152).

Without a special arrangement, the only location

provided for citizens, who live outside city limits, to dispose
of garbage is the dump where the injury occurred.

(Tr. at 151-

152) .
10.

Blanding citizens are not allowed to dispose of garbage

at any other location.
11.

(Tr. at 151-152).

Blanding citizens are not allowed to leave the garbage

along the edge of the precipice, but are required to throw the
garbage over the edge.

(Tr. at 137).
3

12.

A wall, 10-18" in height, separates a person and the

edge of the cliff over which the garbage is thrown.

(Tr. at 21,

151) .
13.

Before the date of Plaintiff's injury, Defendant was

aware that others have been injured at the dump.

(Tr. at 139).

14.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Blanding City in

15.

On June 14, 1993, the trial court entered a scheduling

1991.

order establishing a deadline for the designation of expert
witnesses on August 15, 1993, as well as a deadline for the
filing of discovery of October 3, 1993.
16.

(R. at 288-89).

This Court subsequently modified its scheduling order

by extending the witness designation date to September 30, 1993,
and the discovery cutoff to December 10, 1993.
17.

(R. at 358-59).

On or about September 30, 1993, Plaintiff filed his

designation of witnesses in compliance with the court's
scheduling order.
18.

(R. at 302-04).

Witness #14 on Plaintiff's list of witnesses designates

"Eckoff, Proctor & Watson", an engineering firm in Salt Lake
County, Utah.
19.

(R. at 302-04).

Due to a clerical error, the correct name of Eckoff,

Proctor & Watson is Eckhoff, Watson & Preator.
20.

Defendant was informed of the name of the individual

who would testify for Eckhoff, Watson & Preator during the last
week of November.

(R. at 465) .

4

21.

In a letter dated December 6, 1993, Plaintiff affirmed

Mr. Thorpe's cooperation.
22.

(R. at 413-14).

Plaintiff told Defendant that Mr. Thorpe still had to

review materials and therefore had not yet formed an opinion.
(R. at 414).
23.

Plaintiff informed Defendant that he could depose the

expert at any time, regardless of the discovery deadline.

(R. at

465) .
24.

Defendant finally filed a motion in limine with the

court on January 7, 1994, requesting exclusion of the witness.
(R. at 364).
25.

The trial court granted the motion excluding the

witness on February 2, 1994.
26.

(R. at 413-16).

The trial court's grounds for excluding the witness

were that the Plaintiff did not properly designate his expert
witness until he provide the name of the individual.

(R. at

414) .
27.

Plaintiff's expert testimony would have established the

safety precautions that should have been instituted at the dump
and would have evaluated the design, construction, and
maintenance of the dump under the circumstances of this case.
(R. at 361).
28.

Prior to trial, both Defendant and Plaintiff filed with

the trial court requested jury instructions.
52) .

5

(R. at 423-24, 432-

29.

The court determined the jury instructions to be used

for trial.
30.

(R. at 504-32).

Plaintiff objected to instruction #17 prior to

submitting them to the jury on the grounds that they were not
indicative of the law.
31.

(Tr. at 230) .

Plaintiff proposed that instructions #17-19 from

Plaintiff's requested jury instructions be used.
32.

(Tr. at 230).

The court overruled Plaintiff's objection.

(Tr. at

231) .
33.

Instruction #17 as given to the jury, confused the jury

as to apportioning fault.
34.

(Tr. at 269-70).

The jury wanted to apportion fault to both parties,

however the instruction did not allow it.
35.

(Tr. at 269-73) .

The jury found that Defendant was 0% negligent.

(Tr.

at 273) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

ISSUE 1
A scheduling order required the parties to exchange witness
lists on September 30, 1993.

(R. at 358). The trial court

sanctioned Plaintiff on the grounds that he failed to comply with
this order.

(R. at 413). The trial court excluded Plaintiff's

expert witness.

(R. at 413-15).

Contrary to the court's ruling,

Plaintiff's designation of witness #14 was not in violation of
the scheduling order of the court, nor did it prejudice the
Defendant in the preparation of his case.
6

Plaintiff designated Eckhoff, Watson & Preator as witness
#14 on Plaintiff's list of witnesses.

(R. at 302). This

designation complied with the trial court's order.

(R. at 3 58-

59) .
Rule 30(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a
party to notice the deposition of a corporation without the name
of the specific individual.

When the name is unknown, it is

sufficient to provide a brief description of the matter on which
deposition is sought.

The Corporation or organization must

designate a person to testify at deposition.

The selected

individual must formulate an opinion as of the date of the
deposition.

If an expert is not noticed for deposition, he is

unconstrained from forming or changing his opinion up to the time
of trial.
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator had not yet designated its expert
as of September 30, 1993.

(R. at 465). Still, it should be

remembered that the Defendant could have deposed the witness at
any time after September 30, 1993, as provided in Rule 3 0 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendant chose not to.

Instead,

Defendant waited until January 1994, when he filed a Motion in
Limine to exclude the witness.
The trial court did not expressly require that the name of
the individual be designated.

The order only required a list of

witnesses, obviously, to enable each party to depose the
witnesses in preparation for trial.
the order.
7

Plaintiff did not violate

Plaintiff's designation of witness #14 did not prejudice
Defendant in the preparation of its case.

Defendant could have

noticed the firm's deposition at any time.

(R. at 465).

Plaintiff informed Defendant on November 23, 1993, that Gregory
Thorpe would be the representative of the firm at the time of
trial.
witness.

(R. at 465). This was not a designation of a new
Plaintiff merely identified the individual who would

speak on behalf of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator.

Defendant was

always aware that the expert witness would be provided by
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator.

Defendant therefore, was not

prevented from preparing its case.
Witness exclusion should only be used to sanction a party
for willful noncompliance with a court order.

Other methods are

available when witness exclusion is not warranted.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff did not willfully disregard
the court's scheduling order.

Plaintiff simply did not

understand the court's unexpressed expectations.

Inasmuch as the

Plaintiff did not violate any court order compelling him to
provide the name of the expert, and inasmuch as the Defendant
could have discovered the name at any time by noticing the
deposition of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator, it was an abuse of
discretion for the court to exclude Plaintiff's expert testimony.
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff did violate the order,
the court could have issued other sanctions.

A motion to compel,

on the court's own initiative, or on motion by Defendant, would
have sufficiently notified Plaintiff of his error.
8

Plaintiff

could then have complied with the court's expectations before it
was excessively late in the discovery process.

An order to

exclude the witness, would not have been necessary.
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff violated the scheduling
order, Defendant failed to timely object.

Following Defendant's

receipt of Plaintiff's witness list, Defendant should have moved
to compel the Plaintiff.

Defendant did not.

Instead, Defendant

told Plaintiff to apprise Defendant as soon as possible of the
designated representative of the firm.

(R. at 413).

Plaintiff

advised Defendant of Mr. Thorpe at the end of November.
465).

Defendant still did not object.

(R. at

Instead Defendant waited

until January to file a motion to exclude the witness.

Assuming,

arguendo, Defendant had a right to object, Defendant was untimely
and therefore should be held to have waived its right.
Plaintiff's case was sufficiently prejudiced by the court's
exclusion of his expert witness.

The expert testimony went

directly to the issues on which the jury would base its decision.
The expert would testify regarding design, construction,
maintenance, and safety measures.

(R. at 361). These are all

important factors in determining whether Defendant had a duty and
breached it.

The court's exclusion, therefore, deprived

Plaintiff of his right to present his entire case to a jury.

ISSUE 2
Jury instructions must instruct the jury as to the law of
the jurisdiction and be appropriate given the facts of the case.
9

Instruction #17, (See Appendix 4) in the case at bar, failed
to correctly instruct the jury as to the appropriate law of the
jurisdiction given the facts of the case.
Instruction #17 reads as follows:
the defendant is negligent if, but only if, he (a) knows or
by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the
condition, and should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or
will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails
to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the
danger.
(Tr. at 238-39).
The instruction is based partly on the Restatement Second of
Torts, §343 as it was applied in English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153
(Utah 1993).

The direct application of the undisputed facts, as

they appeared in English, to Section 343, as it is written, was
appropriate only because the case was decided on summary
judgment.

A direct application, as done in English, is

inappropriate as an instruction to a jury which has the duty to
weigh the evidence and apply principles of comparative negligence
to the facts.
Instruction #17 substituted principles of comparative
negligence with principles of contributory negligence.
Instruction #17 calls for the harsh result of total victory or
complete defeat.

Such an outcome is characteristic of a

contributory negligence system, which this state has abolished
when it adopted comparative negligence.
Instruction #17 applies the open and obvious danger rule,
which this state has also abolished.
10

The rule requires the jury

to reach an all or nothing conclusion, as in a contributory
negligence system.

First, if the danger was open and obvious and

Plaintiff unreasonably encountered it, Defendant is not at fault.
Second, if the danger was not open and obvious and Plaintiff
encountered it, Defendant is entirely at fault.
Comment (a) of the Reporter's Notes to Section 343 of the
Restatement Second of Torts states:
this section should be read together with §343A, which deals
with the effect of the fact that the condition is known to
the invitee, or is obvious to him, as well as the fact that
the invitee is a patron of a public utility.
Assuming, arguendo, that instruction #17 was correct, the court
should have also given an instruction similar to Section 343A
which would clarify the intent of the open and obvious nature of
the dump.

Section 343A also clarifies the duty which a

landowner, that is a government agency, has to an invitee.
The misleading effect of Instruction #17 is clearly shown in
the record.

To the court, the jury expressed its desire to

apportion fault to both parties and award damages to plaintiff
but was confused at how to do that given the instructions it had.
The judge instructed them to look to the instructions and special
verdict form for an answer.

However, the instructions and

special verdict form did not allow the jury to act as they
desired.
Any case dealing with injury to visitors upon land must be
based upon principles of premises liability.

In the state of

Utah, the injured visitor is classified as either an Invitee,
Licensee, or Trespasser.

In the case at bar, the Plaintiff is
11

properly classified as an invitee.

The duty that a landowner

owes to an invitee is the duty to discover unreasonably dangerous
conditions and remedy them or warn the visitor of them.

This

applies to landowners who have reason to believe that the invitee
will proceed to encounter a danger despite the danger's obvious
nature.

Instruction #17 did not properly instruct the jury

regarding the foregoing principles.
The instruction regarding Defendant's duty should have
contained two elements.

First, whether the defendant knew, or in

the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that a dangerous
condition existed.
thereafter tha
situation.

Second, whether sufficient time elapsed

action could have been taken to correct the

A separate instruction should have addressed

plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The instruction given to a jury in a premises liability case
should allow the jury to properly apply principles of comparative
negligence.

The Plaintiff has a right to have his fault compared

to the fault attributable to Defendant.

Plaintiff's requested

instructions properly allowed the jury to perform its
responsibility.
The use of instruction #17, in the case at bar,
substantially prejudiced the Plaintiff's case by taking from the
Plaintiff the right to have his fault compared to the fault
attributable to the Defendant.

The instruction caused the jury

to revert back to principles of contributory negligence finding
that if the Plaintiff was also negligent, recovery is barred.
12

The instruction sufficiently misled the jury as to the
appropriate law applicable to premises liability.

Had the proper

instruction been given, a fair comparison of fault would have
been made to make a proper determination of liability.

Plaintiff

would have recovered.

ARGUMENT

ISSUE 1
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OP PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT PREJUDICED THE PLAINTIFF'S
CASE.
The trial court abused its discretion when it excluded

Plaintiff's expert witness from testifying at trial.
exclusion prejudiced Plaintiff's case.

The court's

The expert testimony

would have went directly to the issues on which the jury would
base its decision.

A.

PLAINTIFF'S DESIGNATION OF ECKOF, PROCTOR & WATSON AS
ITS EXPERT WITNESS IS A PROPER DESIGNATION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S SCHEDULING ORDER.

In the case at bar, a scheduling order required Plaintiff to
provide a witness list by September 30, 1993.
Plaintiff complied with the court's order.

(R. at 358).

(R. at 302-04).

Witness #14 on Plaintiff's Witness list was "Eckof, Proctor
& Watson," an engineering firm in Salt Lake City.

(R. at 302).

This engineering firm would provide Plaintiff's expert witness at
trial.

Due to a clerical error the correct name of the
13

engineering firm is Eckhoff, Watson & Preator.

Plaintiff made

the error known to Defendant as soon as it was discovered.
The court excluded Plaintiff's expert witness.

The grounds

for excluding the witness was that "Plaintiff did not properly
designate his expert witness until he provided the name of an
individual."
that:

(R. at 414). The court's reasoning for this was

"it is unreasonable to expect a party to examine every

member of a firm in order to make sure that the eventual witness
has been deposed."

(R. at 415).

Rule 3 0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
"after the commencement of the action, any party may take the
testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon
oral examination."

The rule requires that:

a party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon
oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to
every other party to the action. The notice shall state the
time and place for taking the deposition and the name and
address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the
name is not known, a general description sufficient to
identify him or the particular class or group to which he
belongs.
U.R.C.P. 30(b)(1) (1994).
In a notice of deposition, when the name of the witness is
unknown, it is sufficient to give a description that will
identify the witness or the particular class or group to which
the witness would belong.
When dealing with the deposition of an organization or
corporation, it is sufficient to simply name the organization and
describe with reasonable particularity the matter on which

14

examination is requested.

Subsection (6) of Rule 30(a) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
a party may in his notice and subpoena name as the deponent
a public or private corporation, a partnership, an
association, or a governmental agency and describe with
reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is
requested. In that event, the organization so named shall
designate one or more officers, directors, managing agents,
or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf and
may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on
which he will testify. A subpoena shall advise a nonparty
organization of its duty to make such a designation. The
persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or
reasonably available to the organization.
To notice the deposition of an organization it is therefore, not
necessary that the name of the individual who will represent the
organization at

the time of deposition be known.

When the

organization is a nonparty, a subpoena shall advise it of its
duty to make a designation of the individual who will testify on
its behalf.
The extension of this rule then, as it applies to the
designation of witnesses who are corporations or organizations,
is that a good faith, proper designation of a prospective witness
to opposing counsel must provide the name of the corporation or,
if known, the name of the person assigned to represent the firm.
Obviously, if the person to represent the firm is not yet
designated, it is the firm's responsibility to appoint an
individual prior to the date of deposition.

The fact that the

individual selected to testify is not designated does not relieve
Defendant from the obligation of noticing the deposition of
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator.
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In the case at bar, Plaintiff properly designated Witness
#14 as Eckhoff, Watson & Preator.

(R. at 302) .

The individual

who would testify for the firm was not yet designated, and
therefore not named specifically.

The defendant was not

prejudiced by the lack of the specific name of the individual
because Rule 3 0 permits the Defendant to:
name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a
partnership, an association, or a governmental agency and
describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which
examination is requested.
The Defendant was not precluded from noticing Eckhoff, Watson &
Preator for deposition at any time after September 30, 1993.
Defendant chose not to.

Plaintiff should not be sanctioned for

Defendant's lack of diligence.

B.

AN EXPERT WITNESS MUST BE PREPARED WITH AN OPINION AS
OF THE DATE OF DEPOSITION.

The trial court stated, in its Ruling on Motion to Strike
Plaintiff's Designation of Expert Witness, that:
the expert must, at the very least, be prepared with an
opinion within a reasonable time before discovery ends.
(R. at 415).
Clearly, in coming to this conclusion, the court assumes that the
witness will be deposed by opposing counsel.

However, it is not

always the case that an opinion be formed before discovery ends.
If the opposing party decides not to depose the witness, the
expert is not prevented from forming or changing his opinion up
to the time of his testimony at trial.

The correct assumption

would be that the expert witness must form an opinion prior to
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the recording of his expert testimony, whether that means by
deposition or at trial, for the witness will be held to his
opinion as of that date.
In the case at bar, clearly it would have been in the
Defendant's best interest to depose the expert immediately.

Rule

30(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the
correct procedure for doing so when dealing with an organization
such as Eckhoff, Watson & Preator.

Defendant could have limited

the opinion of the expert to that at the time of deposition.
Defendant chose not to.
Plaintiff should not be penalized for Defendants failure to
act.

If the delay by Defendant's counsel was to allow Plaintiff

sufficient time to prepare, Defendant's counsel should have taken
the deposition of the expert when the expert was prepared.

If

the delay by Defendant's counsel was to lead Plaintiff along
until discovery cutoff and then move to exclude the witness,
Defendant's counsel acted in bad faith and should not be rewarded
for it.

Neither reason warrants the court's sanction, which it

issued against Plaintiff.

C.

WITNESS EXCLUSION SHOULD ONLY BE UTILIZED AS A SANCTION
FOR A WILLFUL NONCOMPLIANCE OF A COURT ORDER.

In Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830
P.2d 291, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992), the court quoted
Nickey v. Brown, 454 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio App. 1982) stating that:
[witness] exclusion is a severe sanction which should be
invoked only to enforce willful noncompliance.
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In the case at bar, Plaintiff did not willfully disobey the
court's scheduling order.
In Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920,
(Utah 1990), the plaintiff objected to Defendant's use of certain
films on the grounds that the films were withheld by Defendants
in violation of the court's discovery order.
sustained the objection.

The trial court

The Supreme Court held, however, that

it was improper to sanction the defendant for not producing the
test films during discovery because they did not fall within the
express terms of the order.
The significance of the foregoing is that a sanction should
only be issued when a party willfully disregards the express
provisions of an order.

In Berrett, the trial court held a

hearing in which it "had an unexpressed expectation that the pretrial order would contain the final witness list".

Berrett v.

Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 184 Utah
Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992).

When plaintiff failed to comply, the

court sanctioned him by excluding an expert witness.

However,

this Court reversed the decision holding that:
absent an order creating a judicially imposed deadline, a
trial court may not sanction a party by excluding its
witnesses under rule 37(b)(2).
Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291,
184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992).

See also Inner City

Wrecking Co. v. Bilskv, 367 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (Ohio App. 1983) .
In the case at bar, Plaintiff complied with the Court's
scheduling order when it listed Eckhoff, Watson & Preator as
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Witness #14.

The scheduling order required simply that a final

list of witnesses be provided.

The list was to enable each party

to begin to depose the witnesses.

It wasn't until the Court's

memorandum Ruling on the Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Designation
of Expert Witness, that the court stated that:

"Plaintiff did

not properly designate his expert witness until he provided the
name of an individual."

(R. at 414).

Just as the court in Berrett had an unexpressed expectation
as to what it meant in its hearing, the trial court, in the case
at bar, had an unexpressed interpretation of what it meant when
it ordered that witness lists be exchanged by September 30, 1993.
Plaintiff did not attempt to be devious, nor did Plaintiff
attempt to act in bad faith.

Plaintiff complied with the express

demands of the order in the manner he understood to be proper.
In Dugan v, Jones,

615 P.2d 1239 (1980), the trial court

ordered the parties to exchange witness lists at least 15 days
before trial.

The order was never written down.

The trial court

subsequently excluded defendants' experts from testifying for
violation of the order.
decision.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the

It held that even though there is no statutory

requirement for reducing orders to writing it should be
encouraged.

"Written pretrial orders reduce the chances for

confusion or memory lapses as to what actually was the agreement
at the conference."

Dugan v. Jones,

615 P.2d 1239, (1980).

Similar to Dugan, in the case at bar, the court's failure to
expressly require what it expected caused confusion and
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ultimately prejudiced the Plaintiff's case.

It was improper to

sanction the Plaintiff for not complying with the court's
unexpressed expectations.
Had Plaintiff been in violation of the court's unexpressed
expectation as to the scheduling order for the designation of
witnesses, Defendant should have filed a motion to compel the
Plaintiff to disclose the name of the expert witness in the
proper form.

This would have expressly notified Plaintiff that

the court required Plaintiff to identify the names of each
witness.

If Plaintiff failed to comply, he would be willfully

disregarding a court order.

The court could then, properly

sanction the Plaintiff by excluding his expert witness.

D.

WITNESS EXCLUSION SHOULD NOT BE UTILIZED WHERE OTHER
OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE COURT.

The court in Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R.
Co., 830 P.2d 291, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992), quoting
Sexton v. Sugar Creek Packing Co., 311 N.E.2d 535,538 (Ohio
1973), stated:
the necessary prerequisite to the imposition of a sanction
is an order that 'brings the offender squarely within
possible contempt of court.'
Absent an order a party may believe that the court has no
objection to the information as supplied.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff did not willfully disregard the
court's order.

In fact, Plaintiff believed that its witness list

was in accordance with the court's expectations.

The lack of a

motion to compel by Defendant confirmed Plaintiff's belief.
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The court, on its own initiative, could have issued an order
compelling Plaintiff to properly comply with the order long
before an exclusion order would be necessary.

Rule 16(d) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling
or pretrial order...the court, upon motion or its own
initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are
just.
U.R.C.P. 16(d) (1994).
Justice demands that if Plaintiff had failed to comply with the
scheduling order, the court should have issued an order to compel
the Plaintiff to do so.

It was an abuse of the court's

discretion to forego a motion to compel and proceed directly to
an exclusion of the witness.
In Dugan v. Jones the Supreme Court held that:
the court could have used means other than exclusion to
sanction defendant's for their noncompliance with the order,
including imposing costs incurred by the other parties in
obtaining experts.
Duaan v. Jones,

615 P.2d 1239 (1980).

In the case at bar, rather than excluding Plaintiff's expert in
February, the court, on its own initiative, could have issued an
order compelling Plaintiff to properly comply with the witness
designation soon after its filing in September.

The court could

also have imposed costs on Plaintiff which Defendant would incur
in having to expedite the deposition taking and transcribing.
The court's sanction was excessive for the error allegedly
committed.
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The court in Inner City Wrecking Co. v. Bilsky, 3 67 N.E.2d
1214, 1218 (Ohio 1983) held:
without an order compelling compliance with court rules, the
sanction imposed by the trial court was beyond its
authority.
In the case at bar, a motion to compel should have been made by
Defendant in a timely manner for two reasons. First, a motion to
compel would have properly notified Plaintiff of his error and
provided an opportunity to correct it.

Second, a motion would

have prevented the needless expense of preparing the expert
witness for trial.

Instead, Defendant and the court allowed

Plaintiff to proceed on the presumption that he was not in
violation of the order.

E.

PLAINTIFF'S CASE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE EXCLUSION OF
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS.

Courts have broad discretion in managing cases that are
before them.

However, when a court's management amounts to an

abuse of discretion the court has exceeded its authority.
In Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830
P.2d 291, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992), quoting Plonkev v.
Superior, 475 P.2d 492, 494 (Ariz. 1970), this Court held that:
Excluding a witness from testifying is, however, "extreme in
nature and...should be employed only with caution and
restraint."
It is not sufficient for reversal that the court merely made
an error in its case management decision.
The mandate of our law is that we do not reverse for mere
error or irregularity. We do so only if the complaining
party has been deprived of a fair trial. The test to be
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applied is: Was there error or irregularity such that there
is a reasonable likelihood to believe that in its absence
there would have been a result more favorable to him?
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Company, Inc., 491 P.2d 1209, 26 Utah
2d 448 (1971).
This is a difficult evaluation.

In Berrett, this court

determined that:
If we cannot, with any degree of assurance, affirm that the
use of such evidence would not have been helpful to the
plaintiff, the doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing
him to have a full and fair presentation of his cause to the
jury.
Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291,
184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992).
In the case at bar, the court's exclusion of Plaintiff's
expert witness sufficiently prejudiced Plaintiff's case.
Plaintiff's expert testimony went directly to the issues that the
jury had to decide.

The expert testimony would have established

the safety precautions that should have been instituted at the
dump under the circumstances of this case.

(R. at 361). The

expert testimony would have gone to the design, construction, and
maintenance of the dump.

(R. at 3 61).

The testimony would have

gone to the duty of Defendant to maintain the dump in a
reasonably safe condition.

(R. at 361).

A significant indication of the importance of Plaintiff's
expert testimony is demonstrated by the actions of Defendant's
counsel.

The very fact that counsel for the Defendant moved to

exclude the testimony at trial indicates that he thought the
matter was of sufficient consequence.
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The trial court held that circumstances at a dump are known
to everyone and therefore an expert witness is not essential. (R.
at 415).

Plaintiff disagrees.

establish duty.

An expert is necessary to

Plaintiff's expert was necessary to educate the

jury as to the proper actions that should have been taken by the
Defendant with respect to the Plaintiff.

To exclude such

testimony, sufficiently infringes on the rights of the Plaintiff
to present his case in full to a jury of his peers.

The court

abused its discretion given it under the rules, and prejudiced
the Plaintiff's case in the process.

F.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE WAS UNTIMELY.

Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff's designation of Witness
#14 was insufficient, Defendant should have objected within a
reasonable time after the service of Plaintiff's Witness List.
In In re Disciplinary Action of George McCune, 717 P.2d 701
(Utah 1986), the court held:
Counsel waived his right to object to the failure to add
three days to the five-day notice period when notice of his
two disciplinary hearings was mailed to him, since he did
not object at the time of either hearing to the notice he
received, and he showed no prejudice resulting from the
shortened time period.
Although this case dealt with Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure regarding service, the principles are applicable to the
case at bar.

Defendant's objection must be timely and must show

prejudice to Defendant's case.
Upon receipt of Plaintiff's Witness List, Defendant was
notified of Plaintiff's expert witness designation.
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Defendant

should have objected, within a reasonable time, to Plaintiff's
designation of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator, as witness #14, if it
was insufficient.

Defendant, however, did not.

Plaintiff informed Defendant that the name of the expert was
not known as of September 30, 1993, but would be designated soon
by Eckhoff, Watson & Preator.

Defendant did not object.

Instead, Defendant told Plaintiff to contact him when Plaintiff
was apprised of the expert's name.
Defendant was informed, by phone, of the expert's name on
November 23, 1993, at least two weeks before discovery cutoff.
(R. at 465).

In a letter dated December 6, 1993, Plaintiff

affirmed Mr. Thorpe's cooperation.

(R. at 413-14).

Defendant

did not object.
Defendant, waited until January 7, 1994, when he finally
objected to Plaintiff's expert witness by moving to exclude the
witness.

(R. at 364). Not only was Defendant's objection

improper because it was untimely, but it also prejudiced
Plaintiff's case.

Due to Defendant's misrepresentations,

Plaintiff continued to prepare his case and incur expenses for
the preparation of his expert witness.

Assuming, arguendo, that

Defendant had a valid objection, due to his failure to timely
object, it should be held that he waived his right to do so.

G.

DEFENDANT'S CASE WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DESIGNATION
OF MR. THORPE AS AN EXPERT WITNESS.

In the Ruling on Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Designation of
Expert Witness, the court found that the Defendant was prejudiced
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because of the late designation of Plaintiff's expert witness.
(R. at 413).
Prior to the scheduling order, Plaintiff and Defendant were
in frequent contact as to Plaintiff's difficulty in finding an
expert that would testify against a city in Utah.

(R. at 465).

Plaintiff located Eckhoff, Watson & Preator, an engineering firm
in Salt Lake, which was willing to provide an expert to testify
at trial.

Plaintiff properly listed the engineering firm in his

Witness list to Defendant on September 30, 1993. (R. at 302-04).
On September 30, 1993, the only fact that Plaintiff knew was
that Eckhoff, Watson & Preator would provide an expert.
had not yet selected the expert who would testify.

The firm

Defendant,

recognizing Plaintiff's position, expressed a willingness to
cooperate.

Defendant, in a letter dated November 24, 1993,

requested that as soon as Plaintiff discovers who
for the firm, that he inform Defendant.

would testify

(R. at 413). The fact

that the name was not disclosed does not relieve Defendant of the
duty to notice the deposition of the witness.

Rule 30 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the manner for doing so
and that it is the responsibility of the party seeking the
deposition to notice the deposition.
Defendant was informed by phone, in late November, that
Gregory Thorpe was selected to represent the engineering firm.
(R. at 465).

Plaintiff indicated to Defendant that Mr. Thorpe

still had to review some materials and therefore had not yet
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formed an opinion.
him at any time.

(R. at 414). However, Defendant could depose
(R at 465).

Defendant never expressed a complaint with delaying the
deposition of the expert. It appeared that his only worry was to
not lose the opportunity to depose the witness after the
discovery deadline.

Plaintiff made it clear that he could depose

the expert at any time.

(R. at 465).

It was not a basis for surprise that Plaintiff did not
inform Defendant until November of who would represent Eckhoff,
Watson & Preator at trial.

Defendant knew all along that an

expert from Eckhoff, Watson & Preator would testify.
Defendant could not claim prejudice.

Therefore,

Contrary to Defendant's

claim, this was not a designation of a new witness.

Plaintiff

simply advised Defendant that Gregory Thorpe would represent
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator, who was already designated as a
witness.
Defendant's case was not prejudiced by the fact that the
name of the expert was not given.
Defendant.

Instead, this benefitted

Had Defendant noticed Eckhoff, Watson & Preator for

deposition, the firm would have had to select a representative in
time for the deposition. U.R.C.P. 30(a)(6).

Furthermore, the

expert would have been held, at the time of trial, to his opinion
as of the date of the deposition.

Had Plaintiff failed to

provide the expert with the necessary materials to form an
opinion, Defendant could have successfully crippled the expert
witness' testimonial effect in the case.
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Defendant did not act

promptly.

Instead, Defendant waited over a month after he was

informed of Mr. Thorpe's willingness to testify, then moved the
court to exclude Mr. Thorpe as a witness.

(R. at 364).

In the case at bar, the parties cooperated with each other
without petitioning the court for approval to deviate slightly
from the schedule.

Defendant's case was not prejudiced by this.

Defendant always knew of the expert and could have noticed
Eckhoff, Watson & Preator for deposition at any time.
In Hill v. Dickerson, 839

P.2d 309, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. 23

(Ct.App. 1992), the defendant agreed to allow the plaintiff to
serve a list of witnesses after the April 19, 1991 scheduling
date requirement.

The agreement was to provide the list if

settlement was not successful.
negotiations ended.
August 19, 1991.

June 28, 1991 settlement

Plaintiff provided the witness list on

This court found that the plaintiff violated

the scheduling order.

Justice Orme, in the dissent, agreed with

the result of the decision but not with the analysis.
Justice Orme stated:
counsel ought to have some flexibility to resolve minor
matters between themselves. Indeed, limited judicial
resources are preserved by not requiring counsel to bother
the court for approval every time they perceive some need to
massage the preliminary details of a scheduling order.
In the case at bar, the parties' cooperation should not be
disregarded.

To now apply the strict scheduling dates would be

improper given the parties' own actions and representations.
The court in Berrett. quoting Jansen v. Lichwa, 474 P. 2d
1020 (Ariz.App. 1970), stated:
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the sanction was improper when complaining party consented
to continuing discovery until trial.
Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291,
184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Ct.App.1992).
In the case at bar, the court's sanction, excluding
Plaintiff's witness, was also improper.

ISSUE 2
INTRODUCTION
Jury instructions must not only instruct the jury as to the
law of the jurisdiction, but the instructions given must also "be
appropriate to the fact situation of the case as was revealed by
the evidence."

Schultz v. Ouintana, 576 P.2d 855 (Utah 1978).

In the case at bar, instruction #17 failed to instruct the
jury as to the law of the jurisdiction and was not appropriate to
the fact situation of the case as revealed by the evidence.
Instruction #17 reads as follows:
the defendant is negligent if, but only if, he (a) knows or
by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the
condition, and should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or
will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails
to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the
danger.
(Tr. at 238-39)
Instruction #17 is based, in part, on the Restatement of
Torts section 343 as it was applied in English v. Kienke, 848
P.2d 153 (Utah 1993).

Section 343 of the Restatement of Torts is

a correct statement of the law regarding premises liability.
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However, the direct application of the undisputed facts, as they
appeared in English, to Section 343, as it is written, was
appropriate only because the case was decided on summary
judgment.

Plaintiff objects to its use as an instruction to a

jury which has the duty to weigh the evidence and apply
principles of comparative negligence to the facts.
properly objected to it's use during trial.

Plaintiff

(Tr. at 230).

Any case dealing with injury to visitors upon land must be
based upon principles of premises liability.
is well established in the State of Utah.

Premises liability

The injured visitor is

classified as either an Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser.

In the

case at bar, the Plaintiff is properly classified as an invitee.
According to Utah premises liability law, the duty that a
landowner owes to an invitee is the duty to discover unreasonably
dangerous conditions and remedy them or warn the visitor of them.
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 24,
754 P.2d 89 (Ct.App.1988).
P.2d 567 (Utah 1978).

Stephenson v. Warner et. al., 581

Plaintiff offered proper instructions

which applied the foregoing principles, however, the court
refused to use apply them in the case at bar.
Use of instruction #17, in the case at bar, substantially
prejudiced the Plaintiff's case by taking from the Plaintiff the
right to have his fault compared to the fault attributable to the
Defendant.

The instruction caused the jury to revert back to

principles of contributory negligence finding that if the
Plaintiff was also negligent, recovery is barred.
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(Tr. at 273).

The instruction sufficiently misled the jury as to the
appropriate law applicable to premises liability.

It applied the

"open and obvious" danger rule, which the State of Utah no longer
recognizes.

Had the proper instruction been given, a fair

comparison of fault would have been made to make a proper
determination of liability.

I.

Plaintiff would have recovered.

INSTRUCTION #17 WAS NOT THE PROPER INSTRUCTION.
Instruction #17 is taken from the Restatement Second of

Torts Section 343 (1965).

Section 343 is a correct statement of

the law regarding landowner liability and was appropriately
applied in English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (1993) .

However, in

the case at bar, it is not a proper instruction when dealing with
the weighing of evidence by a jury and the application of
comparative negligence principles.

A.

INSTRUCTION #17 IS NOT PROPER BASED ON THE FACTS OF THE
CASE AS REVEALED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Subsection (b) of Instruction #17 absolves the defendant of
any liability if defendant "should expect that they will not
discover or realize the danger or will fail to protect themselves
against it."

(Tr. at 238-39).

In other words, if the danger at

the dump is obvious, a reasonable person would realize it.

If

Plaintiff nevertheless proceeds to encounter the danger, then
defendant is not liable for plaintiff's resulting injuries.

Such

an instruction is not appropriate to the fact situation of the
case as revealed by the evidence.
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The site of the injury was a municipal dump.

A city

ordinance requires city residents to subscribe to a garbage
retrieval service.

(Tr. at 151-152).

The City of Blanding does

not provide garbage retrieval for citizens living within the
county but outside city limits.

(Tr. at 151-152).

A special

arrangement must be made with a private contractor for a resident
outside city limits to receive garbage retrieval service.

(Tr.

at 152). Without a special arrangement, the only location
provided for citizens, who live outside city limits, to dispose
of garbage is the dump where the injury occurred.
152) .

(Tr. at 151-

Blanding citizens are required by law to use the dump to

dispose of garbage that is not collected through a garbage
retrieval service.

Blanding citizens are not allowed to dispose

of garbage at any other location.

(Tr. at 151-152).

Furthermore, Blanding citizens are not allowed to leave the
garbage along the edge of the precipice, but are required to
throw the garbage over the edge.

(Tr. at 137). A wall, 10-18"

in height, separates a person and the edge of the cliff over
which the garbage is thrown.

(Tr. at 21, 151). On the day of

the accident, strong winds whipped through the canyon, and smoke
from several small fires in the dump clouded the sky.
132-33).

(Tr. at

The dump had recently been bulldozed by the defendant,

exposing those at the dump to a 30-40 foot precipice.

(Tr. at

141-42) .
Plaintiff, like all citizens of Blanding, was required, by
city ordinance, to incur the risks inherent in the dump site to
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dispose of his garbage.

The Defendant, as a landowner, had a

duty to Plaintiff, as an invitee, to discover unreasonably
dangerous conditions at the dump and remedy them or give
Plaintiff sufficient warning of them.
P.2d 855 (1978).

Schultz v. Ouintana, 576

Defendant cannot require the Plaintiff to use

the dump, then absolve itself of liability when the Plaintiff is
injured at the dump.
such an effect.

Subsection (b) of Instruction #17 produces

(Tr. at 238-39).

The instruction offered to the jury by the court should have
reflected the facts of this case.

The instruction should have

reflected that Plaintiff was required by Defendant to use the
dump and approach the edge of a 30 to 40 foot precipice, which
had recently been created by Defendant's bulldozing.
141-42, 151-52) .

(Tr. at

It should have reflected that strong winds

whipped through the canyon on that particular day, and smoke from
several fires rose up from the dump to the platform.
132-33) .

(Tr. at

It should have reflected that others had been injured

at the dump and the city was aware of it.

(Tr. at 139).

Instruction #17 did not reflect those facts and therefore was
incorrect and prejudiced the Plaintiff.

Had a proper instruction

been given, which properly took into consideration those facts,
Defendant would have been found negligent for not protecting the
Plaintiff from those dangers.

B.

INSTRUCTION #17 IS NOT THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE
LAW OF THE JURISDICTION.
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The effect of instruction #17 is to ignore principles of
comparative negligence and to revert back to a contributory
negligence system.

The instruction states that the defendant was

negligent only if it failed to protect the Plaintiff from a
dangerous condition, which the Defendant knew or should have
known existed and should have expected that Plaintiff would not
realize it.

(Tr. at 239).

The corollary is that if the

Plaintiff knew or should have realized the dangerous condition of
the dump, yet proceeded to encounter the danger, he assumed the
risk and recovery is completely barred.
This type of instruction is appropriate only in a
contributory negligence system.

The deceiving element is

subsection (b) of the instruction, which is the determining
factor of whether the defendant is liable to plaintiff entirely
or not at all.
The State of Utah has abandoned its contributory negligence
system.

Donahue v. Durfee. 780. P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64

(Ct.App.1989).

Utah Code Annotated §78-27-38 (1994), is titled

"Comparative Negligence," and states:
the fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar
recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own.
The same section defines fault to mean:
any actionable breach of legal duty... including, but not
limited to, negligence in all its degrees, contributory
negligence, assumption of risk,...
This court held in Donahue that
the adoption of a comparative negligence system amounts to
an expression by the Legislature that the harsh and
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inflexible result of total victory or unconditional defeat
compelled by the traditional contributory negligence system,
including the open and obvious danger rule, is no longer
acceptable.
Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64
(Ct.App.1989).
The use of an instruction, such as instruction #17, produces
one of two results.

First, if the jury determines that the

plaintiff was not also negligent, the defendant is entirely
liable for the injuries to plaintiff.

Second, if the jury

determines that the plaintiff was also negligent, regardless of
the degree, defendant is absolved of any liability.

Any

instruction which is based on principles of contributory
negligence is inappropriate.
What one would expect, when a jury is given an instruction
based on principles of contributory negligence, occurred in the
case at bar.

(Tr. at 269-270).

The jury could not weigh the

evidence and apportion fault to the parties because instruction
#17 did not allow it.

Either the danger was open and obvious and

Plaintiff assumed the danger by negligently encountering it, or
it was not and Plaintiff could not be required to avoid it.

The

jury's actions were consistent with a jury bound to a
contributory negligence system.
This result is clearly demonstrated by the fact that, under
the instructions given, the jury was unable to apportion fault in
the manner it desired.

(Tr. at 269-70).

The jury's frustration

and confusion is apparent in its mid-deliberation petition to the
court for further instruction.

In desperation, the jury
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questioned the judge, in writing, for additional instruction.
The jury asked:
Judge, the majority of us feel that both parties are at
fault to some extent. Therefore, would it be allowable to
compensate Mr. Laws a monetary amount for pain and suffering
incurred for his injuries? If so, how can we go about this?
(Tr. at 269-270).
Clearly, instruction #17 restricted the jury from comparing fault
and apportioning it accurately.

The response from the judge was

simply "the answers to your question is in the instructions and
the verdict form."

(Tr. at 271).

Without further instruction from the judge the jury was
bound to follow the instructions and the verdict form, even
though they did not allow the jury to compare fault as it
desired.

The jury's answers to the special verdict form depicts

the prejudice to the Plaintiff that instruction #17 produced.
Question: Was the defendant, Blanding City, negligent as
alleged by the plaintiff.
Answer: No.
(Tr. at 273).
Even after indicating that the majority of the jurors wanted to
apportion fault to both parties and award damages, it had to
answer the question

"no". The jury was forced to respond in

such a way because instruction #17 did not allow a comparative
negligence analysis.
Clearly, the instructions, as a whole, were not sufficient
to remedy the prejudicial effect of instruction #17, even when
read in their entirety.

Had the instructions, read in their

entirety, been remedial to the misleading effect of instruction
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#17, the jury would have apportioned fault and awarded damages as
it indicated to the judge that it wanted to do.

Or had a proper

instruction on duty been given, the jury would have been able to
properly apportion fault and award damages.

This error

prejudiced the Plaintiff's case because Plaintiff was not allowed
the privilege of a comparison of his fault with that fault
attributable to defendant.

Consequently, Plaintiff was denied a

recovery that the jury desired to award but couldn't.

C.

INSTRUCTION #17 APPLIES THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DANGER
RULE, WHICH IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS STATE.

In effect, the result of Instruction #17 is to apply the
open and obvious danger rule to premises liability.

The

traditional open and obvious danger rule held that the landowner
had no duty to warn or protect the invitee of any dangerous
condition that was open and obvious.
P.2d 867 (Utah 1978).

Ellertson V. Dansie, 576

The reasoning behind the open and obvious

danger rule was stated by the court in Donahue v. Durfee, 780
P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct.App.1989):
encountering an open and obvious risk is negligence as a
matter of law and, at least under a contributory negligence
system, a plaintiff who is even only slightly negligent is
barred from recovery.
Instruction #17 misleads the jury as to Defendant's duty.
According to the instruction, if the danger at the dump is open
and obvious, yet plaintiff unreasonably chooses to encounter the
danger and is injured, then defendant is absolved of any duty to
protect the plaintiff.
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The consequences of such a rule are that an open and obvious
danger rule does not differentiate between those facts relevant
to the landowner's duty of care and those facts establishing a
total or partial defense to liability.

Under comparative

negligence principles, a plaintiff's unreasonable encounter of a
known danger should be relevant to establishing a defense to
liability.

Defendant's duty of care is the same whether the

plaintiff was unreasonable or not.

However, under instruction

#17, Plaintiff's unreasonable encounter is used to establish
Defendant's lack of a duty of care.
The use of an instruction such as instruction #17 is no
longer the law in Utah.

Donahue v. Durfee. 780 P.2d 1275, 118

Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct.App.1989).
similar to the case at bar.

The facts in Donahue are

The plaintiff was working on the

roof of a building where a high voltage wire hung near the roof.
"Donahue was not warned about the powerline but saw it and
perceived the potentially fatal danger which it posed."

This

court held that:
the Utah Legislature has by necessary implication abolished
the open and obvious danger rule as an absolute bar to an
injured guest's recovery. Our conclusion is premised on two
grounds.
First, the open and obvious danger rule is fundamentally
incompatible with a comparative negligence scheme, which
requires the finder of fact to allocate liability for an
injury based on the relative responsibility of the parties
involved.
Our second point of analysis is premised upon the fact that
the assumption of the risk doctrine has been expressly
abandoned in Utah as a complete bar to recovery due to its
incompatibility with our comparative negligence system. See
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37(2) (1987). See also Moore v.
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 870 (Utah 1981).
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Jacobson Constr. Co. V. Strutco-Lite Ena'cr, Inc., 619 P.2d
306, 309 (Utah 1980).
Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct. App.
1989).
Principles of comparative negligence demand that:
a plaintiff's knowledge, whether it is derived from a
warning or from the facts, even if the facts display the
danger openly and obviously, is a matter that bears upon
plaintiff's own negligence; it should not affect the
defendant's duty.
Parker V. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, (Tex. 1978).
In the case at bar, instruction #17 caused that the
Plaintiff's contributory negligence affect the establishment of
Defendant's duty.
negligent.

The jury, determined that both parties were

(Tr. at 269-70).

The jury, however, was compelled to

find that Defendant lacked a duty to protect the Plaintiff due to
the Plaintiff's contributory negligence.

Plaintiff's rights

demand that the jury "allocate liability based on the relative
responsibility of the parties involved."

Donahue v. Durfee. 780

P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct.App.1989).
Separate instructions should have been given to the jury
which would have properly separated the determination of
Defendant's duty from the analysis of Plaintiff's contributory
negligence.

Plaintiff's Instructions numbers 17-19 were

appropriate instructions in this case.

(R. at 423).

Plaintiff's Instruction #19 properly instructed the jury on
a landowner's duty of care to an invitee.
stated:
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Instruction #19

Blanding City is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to Melvin Laws by a dangerous condition at the
Blanding City Dump if Blanding City:
a) Knew of the dangerous condition, or in the exercise of
ordinary care should have known, that a dangerous condition
existed; and
b) That sufficient time had elapsed to take corrective
action.
Several Utah Courts have applied a landowner's duty of care
instruction in the same manner.

Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta,

Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Ut.Ct.App.1991) . Williams v. Melbv.
P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).
568 (Utah 1978).

(Utah 1973).

Stephenson v. Warner. 581 P.2d 567,

Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 565 P.2d 1139,

1140-41 (Utah 1977).
753 (Utah 1977).
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Ohlson v. Safewav Stores, Inc.. 568 P.2d

Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360

Hampton v. Rowley Builders Supply, 10 Utah 2d 169,

350 P.2d 151 (1960).

Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364,

284 P.2d 477 (1955) .

Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co. et al., 232

P.2d 210, 120 Utah 31 (1951).
Upon reversal and remand of Donahue, the court stated:
at trial the finder of fact must compare the reasonableness
of Donahue's conduct under all the circumstances in
encountering the power line with the reasonableness of
DVF's, Durfee's, and Howell's conduct in creating and
allowing the potentially deadly power line to remain so near
the warehouse roof, in an activated state, while work was
being done on the roof.
Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64
(Ct.App.1989).
Similarly, in the case at bar, the finder of fact should have
compared the reasonableness of Plaintiff's conduct in
encountering the dangers of the dump with the reasonableness of
Defendant's conduct in creating and maintaining the dump in a
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dangerous condition.

All the circumstances should have been

considered in the comparison.

Such circumstances would include

the fact that Plaintiff was not allowed to dispose of garbage
except at the dump site and was required to throw the garbage
over the edge of a 30 to 40 foot precipice, where a low 10 to 18
inch wall was the only guard to prevent falling.
151-153).

(Tr. at 21,

While, the Defendant had taken no steps to protect

individuals from the dangers of the dump.

(Tr. at 140).

Defendant argues that Section 343 of the Restatement Second
of Torts allowed the jury to properly decide the case and,
therefore, was properly applied in the case at bar just as it was
applied in English v.Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (1993).
incorrect.

This is

Although Section 343 was correctly applied in

English, its application is limited to the facts of that case.
English was decided on summary judgment.

On summary

judgment, the rule is clear that the court is prohibited from
weighing the evidence and determining negligence.

The court in

English determined whether there were any genuine issues of
material fact.

In its analysis it applied uncontested material

facts to the law applicable to the matter.

A weighing of the

evidence and comparison of fault was prohibited; therefore, a
direct application of the law to the facts was apropos.
In the case at bar, it was not appropriate for the jury to
do the same because the responsibility of the jury is to weigh
the evidence and apportion fault.

In the case at bar, a direct

application to the rule, as done in English, took that
41

responsibility away from the jury.

The instruction misled the

jury because, as written, it caused the jury to make its
determination based upon principles of contributory negligence.
The jury was compelled to determine the case based on the open
and obvious danger rule and assumption of the risk.

The jury

decided that, because the danger was open and obvious, Plaintiff
assumed the risk and therefore, Defendant had no duty to protect
him.

(Tr. at 269-73).

This, the jury decided, even though they

desired to apportion fault to Defendant and award Plaintiff
damages.

D.

(Tr. at 269-73).

AN INSTRUCTION ON SECTION 343 OF THE RESTATEMENT SECOND
OF TORTS IS ONLY PROPER WHEN GIVEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH
AN INSTRUCTION ON SECTION 343A.

Assuming, arguendo, that instruction #17 was the correct
instruction according to the law of the jurisdiction, then an
additional instruction was necessary for clarification.

An

instruction similar to Section 343A of the Restatement Second of
Torts was necessary to clarify the intent of subsection (b) of
Section 343, from which the instruction was taken.

Comment (a)

of the Reporter's Notes to section 343, states:
this section should be read together with §343A, which deals
with the effect of the fact that the condition is known to
the invitee, or is obvious to him, as well as the fact that
the invitee is a patron of a public utility.
Restatement Second of Torts, §343 cmt. a (1965).
Section 343A of the Restatement Second of Torts states
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on
the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless
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the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate
harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the
invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the
facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance
indicating that the harm should be anticipated.
Restatement Second of Torts, §343A (1965).
The importance of this section in conjunction with Section 343 is
that it clarifies the duties of the possessor and invitee when an
open and obvious dangerous condition exists on the land of a
public utility, government, or government agency.
Comment (a) to Section 343A states that this rule applies to
all invitees, including "members of the public making use of the
land of the government or government agency which is held open
for the use of the public."

Most significant in comment (a) is:

as is stated in Subsection (2), such a public utility,
government, or government agency may have special reason to
anticipate that one who so enters will proceed to encounter
known or obvious dangers; and such a defendant may therefore
be subject to liability in some cases where the ordinary
possessor of land would not.
If the court determined that instruction #17 was necessary
and appropriate under the circumstances of this case, the court
should have included an instruction mirroring Section 343A.

The

facts of this case warranted such a clarifying instruction.
Comment f. of the Reporter's Notes to Section 343A states:
There are, however, cases in which the possessor of land can
and should anticipate that the dangerous condition will
cause physical harm to the invitee notwithstanding its known
or obvious danger. In such cases the possessor is not
relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to the
invitee for his protection. This duty may require him to
warn the invitee, or take other reasonable steps to protect
him, against the known or obvious condition or activity, if
43

the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will
nevertheless suffer physical harm.
Such reason may also arise where the possessor has reason to
expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known
or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his
position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the
apparent risk.
Comment g. of the Restatement Second of Torts Section 343A
states:
In determining whether the possessor of land should expect
harm to invitees notwithstanding the known or obvious
character of the danger, the fact that premises have been
held open to the visitor, and that he has been invited to
use them, is always a factor to be considered, as offering
some assurance to the invitee that the place has been
prepared for his reception, and that reasonable care has
been used to make it safe. There is, however, a special
reason for the possessor to anticipate harm where the
possessor is a public utility, which has undertaken to
render services to members of the public... The same is
true of the government, or a government agency, which
maintains land upon which the public are invited and
entitled to enter as a matter of public right. Such
defendants may reasonably expect the public, in the course
of the entry of use to which they are entitled, to proceed
to encounter some known or obvious dangers which are not
unduly extreme, rather than to forego the right.
The foregoing comments to Section 343A were written for the case
at bar.
Here, the Plaintiff was required by city ordinance to
dispose of his garbage at the dump.

(Tr. at 152-153) .

Plaintiff

was not allowed to leave the garbage near the edge of the
precipice, but he was required to throw the garbage over the edge
of a 30 to 40 foot precipice. (Tr. at 137, 152-153).
18 inch wall was the only guard to prevent falling.
21,151).

A low 10 to
(Tr. at

The Defendant had recently bulldozed the dump creating

the 30 to 40 foot precipice.

(Tr. at 141-42) .

Clearly,

Defendant was in a position to realize that even though the
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Plaintiff may have realized the dangerous condition of the dump,
Plaintiff would nevertheless proceed to encounter them.
Defendant nevertheless, failed to take any steps to protect
individuals using the dump.

(Tr. at 140).

Had an instruction similar to Section 343A been given, a
proper analysis of the facts could have been made by the jury.
Without this instruction, the jury was misled and Plaintiff's
case was prejudiced.

The jury was left to decide only that the

dangerous condition of the dump should have been known or obvious
to the Plaintiff.

Consequently, any injuries sustained from

encountering the danger were due to the Plaintiff's contributory
negligence.

II.

PROPER INSTRUCTION MUST BE FOUNDED ON TRADITIONAL PREMISES
LIABILITY PRINCIPLES.
Given the facts of the case at bar, proper instruction

should have been based on traditional premises liability
principles, which are well established in the State of Utah.

A.

DEFENDANT HAS DUTY TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF FROM
UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS ON PREMISES.

"The duty of care owed by a possessor of land is determined
by the status of the person who comes onto the property."
v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co., 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991).

Pratt
The

relationship between the parties (injured and possessor)
determines the status of the plaintiff at the time of the injury,
as a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee.
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Gregory v.

Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 24
(Ct.App.1988).

Such status determines the measure of duty owed

by the landowner to the injured, and therefore the landowner's
liability, if his breach of such duty caused the injury.

Gregory

v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 82 Utah Adv. Rep.
24 (Ct.App.1988).

Tias v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, (Utah 1979).

Under the facts of this case, Plaintiff is considered an
invitee.
Sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement Second of Torts
properly explain premises liability as applied to invitees.
Section 343 states:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land, but
only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care
would discover the condition, and should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
against the danger.
Section 343A states:
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on
the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless
the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness.
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate
harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the
invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the
facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance
indicating that the harm should be anticipated.
Restatement Second of Torts §343A .

B.

THE JURY INSTRUCTION MUST CORRECTLY STATE DEFENDANT'S
DUTY WITHOUT ABROGATING THIS STATE'S COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE SYSTEM.

46

Although Section 343 of the Restatement Second of Torts is
the law applicable to premises liability, as an instruction, it
supplants comparative negligence with contributory negligence.
To preserve principles of comparative negligence, Section 343
must be divided into separate instructions.

One instruction must

address the landowner's duty as described in Section 343A and
Subsections (a) and (c) of Section 343.

The second instruction

must address the visitor's contributory negligence as written in
Subsection (b) of Section 343.
The method of determining a landowner's breach of duty as
stated in Section 343A and Subsections (a) and (c) of Section 343
has been, and continues to be, as stated in Martin v. Safeway
Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977).

Although this and

subsequent cases are "slip-and-fall" cases, the principles of
premises liability are the same.
In Martin, the court stated:
the essential inquiry relating to defendant's negligence is
whether the defendant's employees knew, or in the exercise
of ordinary care should have known, that a dangerous
condition existed, and whether sufficient time elapsed
thereafter that action could have been taken to correct the
situation.
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977) .
The same analysis continues to be made by the courts in
determining a landowner's breach of duty.

Gregory v. Fourthwest

Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 24
(Ct.App.1988).

Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d 1191,

(Utah Ct.App. 1987).

Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224, 200
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Utah Adv. Rep. 61 (Ct.App. 1991).

Allen v. Federated Dairy

Farms. 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975).
In fact, in Gregory, the court held that in order to find
the defendant liable:
the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant knew, or in
the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that a
dangerous condition existed and that sufficient time had
elapsed to take corrective action.
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 82 Utah
Adv. Rep. 24 (Ct.App. 1988).
In the case at bar, the jury should have been instructed on
the foregoing principles of premises liability.

The first

inquiry should have been whether the Defendant knew or should
have known of the dangerous condition.

The second inquiry should

have been whether sufficient time elapsed that Defendant could
have taken corrective action to remedy the situation.
Plaintiff's Instructions #17-19 instructed the jury accordingly.
Plaintiff objected to the courts refusal to use the appropriate
instruction.

(Tr. at 230) .

A separate instruction should have addressed the Plaintiff's
contributory negligence as written in subsection (b) of section
343 of the Restatement Second of Torts.

The inquiry should have

been whether a reasonable person would have realized the
dangerous condition and avoided it.

Taken into consideration

should have been the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's
encountering the danger as noted in Section 343A of the
Restatement Second of Torts.
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The danger of combining the two instructions is that the
Plaintiff's contributory negligence may be held to abrogate
Defendant's duty.

The court said in Parker V. Highland Park,

Inc. 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978):
a plaintiff's knowledge, whether it is derived from a
warning or from the facts, even if the facts display the
danger openly and obviously, is a matter that bears upon
plaintiff's own negligence; it should not affect the
defendant's duty.
If the Plaintiff's negligence is analyzed under an instruction
similar to Instruction #17, the determination of Defendant's duty
is affected.

In other words, what happened in the case at bar is

the outcome.

Even though the majority of the jurors desired to

apportion fault to both parties, they were forced to abrogate
Defendant's duty because the instruction did not allow the jury
to apportion and compare fault.

(Tr. at 269-273) .

An example of the correct approach in applying the
Restatement to jury instructions is found in Erickson v. Walgreen
Drug Co. et al., 232 P.2d 210, 120 Utah 31 (1951).

In Erickson,

the court quoted the Restatement of Torts and acknowledged it to
be the correct rule of law governing premises liability.

The

instruction given to apply that rule was as follows:
it was the duty of [the appellant] to exercise reasonable
care to keep the entranceway to its store reasonably safe
for the use of its customers; and in this regard you are
instructed that if you shall find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the entranceway was not reasonably safe in
that the floor of the entranceway had become wet from rain
water and slick and slippery and that [the appellant] knew
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of
said condition, and failed to exercise reasonable care to
remedy said condition and make said entranceway reasonably
safe for the use of its customers, by means of warning signs
to advise of the slick condition or by covering the terrazzo
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entrance with rubber mats or other substances to prevent
slipping, then [the appellant] was negligent;
The court stated in Ohlson v. Safeway Stores Inc., that
the jury was properly instructed that the defendant could
not be held liable for any injury suffered by plaintiff, a
business invitee, resulting from a dangerous condition not
caused by acts of the defendant itself and of which the
defendant had no knowledge, unless that condition existed
for such a length of time that if the defendant exercised
ordinary care it would have discovered the condition and
could and would have remedied it before the time of the
injury.
Even though the foregoing courts adhered to the Restatement rule
of premises liability, their jury instructions reflect the
correct approach in applying the rule.

It is the same approach

petitioned by the Plaintiff in the case at bar.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's designation of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator as
witness #14 on Plaintiff's list of witnesses was a proper
designation.
order.

Plaintiff did not violate the court's scheduling

The court's exclusion of Plaintiff's expert witness

therefore, was an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiff's expert testimony applied directly to the issues
on which the jury was to base its decision.

The design,

construction, maintenance and safety precautions were important
elements in deciding whether Defendant had a duty and breached
it.

Exclusion of the witness, prevented the Plaintiff from

presenting his entire case to a jury, which substantially
prejudiced Plaintiff's case.
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Instruction #17 in the case at bar supplanted this state's
comparative negligence system with contributory negligence
principles.

The jury was misled by the instruction and compelled

to determine that Plaintiff's contributory negligence abrogated
Defendant's duty.

The record clearly indicates that the jury

desired to apportion fault to both parties, yet it was compelled
to abrogate Defendant's duty because the instruction did not
allow the jury to apportion and compare fault.

(Tr. at 269-273).

The misleading instruction was not remedied by a reading of
the instructions in their entirety.

Instead, the jury was

compelled to act within principles of contributory negligence and
abrogate the Defendant's duty and find the Plaintiff entirely at
fault, thereby denying Plaintiff any recovery.
Plaintiff contends that the instruction given was incorrect.
Plaintiff further contends that the misleading effect of the
instruction substantially prejudiced the Plaintiff's case and
affected his rights.

Had this error not been committed, the

result of this case would have been different.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
decision of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this

'ffftday of [ jj^o^Jr

, 1994.

O
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C.

DONALD E. M^CAJJDLESS
DARWIN C. FIStfER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Rule 28

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

resent them, and, in case they are not otherwise
represented, shall cross-examine the deponent. If
any expected adverse party is a minor or incompetent the provisions of Rule 17(c) apply.
(3) Order and examination. If the court is
satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony
may prevent a failure or delay of justice, it shall
make an order designating or describing the persons whose depositions may be taken and specifying the subject matter of the examination and
whether the depositions shall be taken upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The depositions may then be taken in accordance with
these rules; and the court may make orders of the
character provided for by Rules 34 and 35. For
the purpose of applying these rules to depositions
for perpetuating testimony, each reference
therein to the court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to refer to the court in which
the petition for such deposition was filed.
(4) Use of deposition. If a deposition to perpetuate testimony is taken under these rules or
if, although not so taken, it would be admissible
in evidence in the courts of the state in which it
is taken, it may be used in any action involving
the same subject matter subsequently brought in
any court of this state, in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 26(d) (Rule 32(a)].
(b) Pending appeal. If an appeal has been taken
from a judgment of a district court or before the taking of an appeal if the time therefor has not expired,
the district court in which the judgment was rendered
may allow the taking of the depositions of witnesses
to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of
further proceedings in such court. In such case the
party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may
make a motion in the district court for leave to take
the depositions, upon the same notice and service
thereof as if the action was pending in the district
court. The motion shall show (1) the names and addresses of persons to be examined and the substance
of the testimony which he expects to elicit from each;
(2) the reasons for perpetuating their testimony. If
the court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony
is proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may
make an order allowing the depositions to be taken
and may make orders of the character provided for by
Rules 34 and 35, and thereupon the depositions may
be taken and used in the same manner and under the
same conditions as are prescribed in these rules for
depositions taken in actions pending in the district
court.
(c) Perpetuation by action. This rule does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an action to
perpetuate testimony.
Rule 28. Persons before whom depositions may
be taken.
(a) Within the United States. Within the United
States or within a territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, depositions shall be taken before an officer authorized to
administer oaths by the laws of the United States or
of the place where the examination is held, or before
a person appointed by the court in which the action is
pending. A person so appointed has power to administer oaths and take testimony. The term "officer" as
used in Rules 30, 31, and 32 includes a person appointed by the court or designated by the parties under Rule 29.
(b) In foreign countries. In a foreign country, depositions may be taken (1) on notice before a person
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authorized to administer oaths in the place in which
the examination is held, either by the law thereof or
by the law of the United States, or (2) before a person
commissioned by the court, and a person so commissioned shall have the power by virtue of his commission to administer any necessary oath and take testimony, or (3) pursuant to a letter rogatory. A commission or a letter rogatory shall be issued on application
and notice and on terms that are just and appropriate. It is not requisite to the issuance of a commission
or a letter rogatory that the taking of the deposition
in any other manner is impracticable or inconvenient; and both a commission and a letter rogatory
may be issued in proper cases. A notice or commission
may designate the person before whom the deposition
is to be taken either by name or descriptive title. A
letter rogatory may be addressed "To the Appropriate
Authority in [here name of country]-" Evidence obtained in response to a letter rogatory need not be
excluded merely for the reason that it is not a verbatim transcript or that the testimony was not taken
under oath or for any similar departure from the requirements for depositions taken within the United
States under these rules.
(c) Disqualification for interest. No deposition
shall be taken before a person who is a relative or
employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties,
or is a relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or is financially interested in the action.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 29. Stipulations regarding discovery procedure.
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may
by written stipulation
(1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or place, upon any
notice, and in any manner and when so taken
may be used like other depositions, and
(2) modify the procedures provided by these
rules for other methods of discovery.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 30. Depositions upon oral examination.
(a) When depositions may be taken. After commencement of the action, any party may take the
testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination. Leave of court, granted
with or without notice, must be obtained only if the
plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to the expiration of 30 days after service of the summons and complaint upon any defendant or service made under
Rule 4(e), except that leave is not required (1) if a
defendant has served a notice of taking deposition or
otherwise sought discovery, or (2) if special notice is
given as provided in Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by
subpoena as provided in Rule 45. The deposition of a
person confined in prison may be taken only by leave
of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
(b) Notice of examination; general requirements; special notice; non-stenographic recording; production of documents and things; deposition of organization; deposition by telephone.
( D A party desiring to take the deposition of
any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to
the action. The notice shall state the time and
place for taking the deposition and the name and
address of each person to be examined, if known,
and, if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular
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class or group to which he belongs. If a subpoena
duces tecum is to be served on the person to be
examined, the designation of the materials to be
produced as set forth in the subpoena shall be
attached to or included in the notice.
(2) Leave of court is not required for the taking of a deposition by plaintiff if the notice (A)
states that the person to be examined is about to
go out of the district where the action is pending
and more than 100 miles from the place of trial,
or is about to go out of the United States, or is
bound on a voyage to sea, and will be unavailable
for examination unless his deposition is taken
before expiration of the 30-day period, and (B)
sets forth facts to support the statement. The
plaintiffs attorney shall sign the notice, and his
signature constitutes a certification by him that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief the statement and supporting facts are
true. The sanctions provided by Rule 11 are applicable to the certification.
If a party shows that when he was served with
notice under this Subdivision (b)(2) he was unaule through the exercise of diligence to obtain
counsel to represent him at the taking of the deposition, the deposition may not be used against
him.
(3) The court may for cause shown enlarge or
shorten the time for taking the deposition.
(4) The parties may stipulate in writing or the
court may upon motion order that the testimony
at a deposition be recorded by other than stenographic means. The stipulation or order shall
designate the person before whom the deposition
shall be taken and the manner of recording, preserving, and filing the deposition and may include other provisions to assure that the recorded
testimony will be accurate and trustworthy. A
party may arrange to have a stenographic transcription made at his own expense. Any objections under Subdivision (c), any changes made by
the witness, his signature identifying the deposition as his own or the statement of the officer
that is required if the witness does not sign, as
provided in Subdivision (e), and the certification
of the officer required by Subdivision (f) shall be
set forth in a writing to accompany a deposition
recorded by nonstenographic means.
(5) The notice to a party deponent may be accompanied by a request made in compliance with
Rule 34 for the production of documents and tangible things at the taking of the deposition. The
procedure of Rule 34 shall apply to the request.
(6) A party may in his notice and in a subpoena name as the deponent a public or private
corporation, a partnership, an association, or a
governmental agency and describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. In that event, the organization
so named shall designate one or more officers,
directors, managing agents, or other persons who
consent to testify on its behalf and may set forth,
for each person designated, the matters on which
he will testify. A subpoena shall advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make such a
designation. The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available
to the organization. This Subdivision (b)(6) does
not preclude taking a deposition by any other
procedure authorized in these rules.
(7) The parties may stipulate in writing or the
court may upon motion order that a deposition be
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taken by telephone. For the purposes of this rule
and Rules 28(a), 37(b)(1), and 45(d), a deposition
taken by telephone is taken at the place where
the deponent is to answer questions propounded
to him.
(c) Examination and cross-examination; record of examination; oath; objections. Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed
as permitted at the trial under the provisions of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. The officer before whom the
deposition is to be taken shall put the witnesses on
oath and shall personally or by someone acting under
his direction and in his presence record the testimony
of the witness. The testimony shall be taken stenographically or recorded by any other means ordered
in accordance with Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule. If
requested by one of the parties, the testimony shall be
transcribed.
All objections made at the time of the examination
to the qualifications of the officer taking the deposition, to the manner of taking it, to the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party and any other
objection to the proceedings shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. Evidence objected to shall be
taken subject to the objections. In lieu of participating in the oral examination, parties may serve written questions in a sealed envelope on the party taking
the deposition, and he shall transmit them to the officer, who shall propound them to the witness and
record the answers verbatim.
(d) Motion to terminate or limit examination.
At any time during the taking of the deposition, on
motion of a party or of the deponent and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad
faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the
court in which the action is pending or the court in
the district where the deposition is being taken may
order the officer conducting the examination to cease
forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit
the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition
as provided in Rule 26(c). If the order made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter
only upon the order of the court in which the action is
pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to make a motion for
an order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the
award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(e) Submission to witness; changes; signing.
When the testimony is fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by him, unless such examination and reading are waived by the witness and by
the parties. Any changes in form or substance which
the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the
deposition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them. The deposition shall then be signed by the witness, unless the
parties by stipulation waive the signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the
deposition is not signed by the witness within 30 days
of its submission to him, the officer shall sign it and
state on the record the fact of the waiver or of the
illness or absence of the witness or the fact of the
refusal to sign together with the reason, if any, given
therefore; and the deposition may then be used as
fully as though signed unless on a motion to suppress
under Rule 32(d)(4) (Rule 32(c)(4)] the court holds
that the reasons given for the refusal to sign require
rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.
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(0 Certification and filing by officer; exhibits;
copies; notice of filing.
(1) The officer shall certify on the deposition
that the witness was duly sworn by him and that
the deposition is a true record of the testimony
given by the witness. Unless otherwise ordered
by the court, he shall then securely seal the deposition in an envelope endorsed with the title of
the action and marked "Deposition of [here insert
name of witness]" and shall promptly file it with
the court in which the action is pending or send it
by registered or certified mail to the clerk thereof
for filing.
Documents and things produced for inspection
during the examination of the witness shall,
upon the request of the party, be marked for
identification and annexed to the deposition and
may be inspected and copied by any party, except
that if the person producing the materials desires
to retain them he may (A) offer copies to be
marked for identification and annexed to the deposition and to serve thereafter as originals, if he
affords to all parties fair opportunity to verify the
copies by comparison with the originals, or (B)
offer the originals to be marked for identification,
after giving to each party an opportunity to inspect and copy them, in which event the materials may be used in the same manner as if annexed to the deposition. Any party may move for
an order that the original be annexed to and returned with the deposition to the court, pending
final disposition of the case.
(2) Upon payment of reasonable charges therefore, the officer shall furnish a copy of the deposition to any party or to the deponent.
(3) The party taking the deposition shall give
prompt notice of its filing to all other parties.
(g) Failure to attend or to serve subpoena; expenses.
(1) If the party giving the notice of the taking
of a deposition fails to attend and proceed therewith and another party attends in person or by
attorney pursuant to the notice, the court may
order the party giving the notice to pay to such
other party the reasonable expenses incurred by
him and his attorney in attending, including reasonable attorney's fees.
(2) If the party giving the notice of the taking
of a deposition of a witness fails to serve a subpoena upon him and the witness because of such
failure does not attend, and if another party attends in person or by attorney because he expects
the deposition of that witness to be taken, the
court may order the party giving the notice to
pay to such other party the reasonable expenses
incurred by him and his attorney in attending,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 31. Depositions upon written questions.
(a) Serving questions; notice. After commencement of the action, any party may take the testimony
of any person, including a party, by deposition upon
written questions. The attendance of witnesses may
be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided by
Rule 45. The deposition of a person confined in prison
may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as
the court prescribes.
A party desiring to take a deposition upon written
questions shall serve them upon every other party
with a notice stating (1) the name and address of the
person who is to answer them, if known, and if the
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name is not known, a general description sufficient to
identify him or the particular class or group to which
he belongs, and (2) the name or descriptive title and
address of the officer before whom the deposition is to
be taken. A deposition upon written questions may be
taken of a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(b)(6).
Within 30 days after the notice and written questions are served, a party may serve cross questions
upon all other parties. Within 10 days after being
served with cross questions, a party may serve redirect questions upon all other parties. Within 10 days
after being served with redirect questions, a party
may serve recross questions upon all other parties.
The court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the
time.
(b) Officer to take responses and prepare
record. A copy of the notice and copies of all questions served shall be delivered by the party taking
the deposition to the officer designated in the notice,
who shall proceed promptly, in the manner provided
by Rule 30(c), (e), and (f). to take the testimony of the
witness in response to the questions and to prepare,
certify, and file or mail the deposition, attaching
thereto the copy of the notice and the questions received by him.
(c) Notice of filing. When the deposition is filed
the party taking it shall promptly give notice thereof
to all other parties.
Rule 32. Use of depositions in court proceedings.
(a) Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the
hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding,
any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible
under the rules of evidence applied as though the
witness were then present and testifying, may be
used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had
reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of
the following provisions:
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching
the testimony of [a] deponent as a witness or for
any other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules
of Evidence.
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who
at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on
behalf of a public or private corporation, partnership or association or governmental agency
which is a party may be used by an adverse party
for any purpose.
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not
a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds:
(A) that the witness is dead; or
(B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial
or hearing, or is out of the United States,
unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or
(C) that the witness is unable to attend or
testify because of age. illness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or
(D) that the party offering the deposition
has been unable to procure the attendance of
the witness by subpoena; or
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In any action so certified to the district court, when
any responsive pleading is required or permitted or a
motion is allowed under these rules, the time in
which such responsive pleading or motion shall be
made shall commence to run from the time notice of
the filing of the cause in the district court shall be
served on the party making such responsive pleading
or motion.
Rule 14. Third-party practice.
(a) When defendant may bring in third party.
At any time after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for
all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him. The
third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make
the service if he files the third-party complaint not
later than ten days after he serves his original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon
notice to all parties to the action. The person served
with the summons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his
defenses to the third-party plaintiffs claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the
third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other
third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The
third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiffany defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to
the plaintiffs claim. The third-party defendant may
also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party
plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against
the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff, and
the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his
defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims
and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A thirdparty defendant may proceed under this rule against
any person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the
action against the third-party defendant.
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party.
When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff,
he may cause a third party to be brought in under
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a
defendant to do so.
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to
an amended pleading within the time remaining for
response to the original pleading or within 10 days
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise
orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
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evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or
defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it
shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and
management conferences.
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court
in its discretion or upon motion of a party, may direct
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented
parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as:
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control
so that the case will not be protracted for lack of
management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through
more thorough preparation;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the
orderly disposition of the case.
(b) Scheduling and management conferences.
In any action, in addition to any pretrial conferences
that may be scheduled, the court in its discretion may
direct that a scheduling or management conference
be held. The court may direct the attorneys or unrepresented parties to appear before the court. Scheduling or management conferences may also be held by
way of telephone conferencing between the court and
counsel as the particular case may require. Decisions
and agreements reached at scheduling and management conferences may be formally made an order of
the court. At the conference, the court may consider
the following matters:
(1) the formation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous
claims or defenses;
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining additional parties or amendment of pleadings;
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery;
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions;
(5) the possibility of obtaining admissions of
fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations regarding the authentic-
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to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and
does not include therein all defenses and objections
then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so
omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either
by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits,
and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at
the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule
15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been
received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing
of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff.
When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this
state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded
against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor,
the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00
undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded
against such plaintiff. No security shall be required
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the
plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered
within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order
dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim.
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall
state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time
of serving the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state
the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced
the claim was the subject of another pending action,
or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim
by attachment or other process by which the court did
not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any
counterclaim under this Rule 13.
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may
state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing
party's claim.
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A
counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the
recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim
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relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from
that sought in the pleading of the opposing party.
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after
pleading. A claim which either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may,
with the permission of the court, be presented as a
counterclaim by supplemental pleading.
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails
to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires,
he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by
amendment.
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading
may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of the
original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim
that the party against whom it is asserted is or may
be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a
claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When
the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete
relief in the determination of a counterclaim or crossclaim, the court shall order them to be brought in as
defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction
of them can be obtained.
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be rendered in accordance
with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the
opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of.
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment
or death. When cross demands have existed between
persons under such circumstances that, if one had
brought an action against the other, a counterclaim
could have been set up, the two demands shall be
deemed compensated so far as they equal each other,
and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by
the assignment or death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise
provided by law as to negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted
against an assignor at the time of or before notice of
such assignment, may be asserted against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim
of the assignee.
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction.
Where any counterclaim or cross-claim or third-party
claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court
does not have the power to grant the relief sought
thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire
action and certify the same and transmit all papers
therein to the district court of the county in which
such inferior court is maintained, upon the payment
by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party claim of the fees required for certifying
the record on appeal from such court and for docketing the same in the district court. The fees herein
required to be paid, shall be deposited with the clerk
of the inferior court at the time of filing such counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so
to do, the court may, upon motion of the adverse
party, after notice, strike such counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim.
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78-27-33

JUDICIAL CODE

charge of this person from any hospital or sanitarium
in which the injured person is confined as a result of
the injuries sustained in the occurrence, is voidable
by the injured person, as provided in this act.
(2) Notice of cancellation of the release or settlement agreement, together with any payment or other
consideration received in connection with this release
or agreement shall be mailed or delivered to the party
to whom the release or settlement agreement was
given, by the later of the following dates:
(a) within fifteen days from the date of the occurrence causing the injuries which are subject of
the settlement agreement or liability release; or
(b) within fifteen days after the date of the injured person's discharge from the hospital or sanitarium in which this person has been confined
continuously since the date of the occurrence
1973
causing the injury78-27-33. Statement of injured person — When
inadmissible as evidence.
Except as otherwise provided in this act, any statement, either written or oral, obtained from an injured
person within 15 days of an occurrence or while this
person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a
result of injuries sustained in the occurrence, and
which statement is obtained by a person whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to the injured
person, except a law enforcement officer, shall not be
admissible as evidence in any civil proceeding
brought by or against the injured person for damages
sustained as a result of the occurrence, unless:
( l ) a written verbatim copy of the statement
has been left with the injured party at the time
the statement was taken; and
(2) the statement has not been disavowed in
writing within fifteen days of the date of the
statement or within fifteen days after the date of
the injured person's initial discharge from the
hospital or sanitarium in which the person has
been confined, whichever date is later.
1992
78-27-34. Release, settlement or statement by injured person — When rescission or disavowal provisions inapplicable.
This act shall not apply in the following circumstances:
If at least five days prior to signing the settlement agreement, liability release, or statement,
the injured person has signed a statement in
writing indicating his willingness that the settlement agreement, liability release, or statement
be given or signed.
1992
78-27-35.

Release, settlement, or statement b y
injured person — Notice of rescission
or disavowal.
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement, if given by mail, is given when it is deposited in
a mailbox, properly addressed with postage prepaid.
Notice of cancellation given by the injured person
need not take a particular form and is sufficient if it
indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the injured person not to be bound by the settlement agreement, liability release, or disavowed
statement.
1973
78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, settlement, or statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.
The rights provided by this act are intended to be
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any rights of rescis-
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sion, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise existing in the law.
1973
78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a
person immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is claimed to be liable because of
fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery, including negligence in
all its degrees, contributor}' negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or
implied warranty of a product, products liability,
and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person immune from suit" means:
(a) an employer immune from suit under
Title 35, Chapter 1 or 2; and
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit pursuant to
Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act.
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its
own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is
authorized to act as legal representative.
1994
78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not
alone bar recovery by that person.
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from
any defendant or group of defendants whose fault,
combined with the fault of persons immune from suit,
exceeds the fault of the person seeking recovery prior
to any reallocation of fault made under Subsection
78-27-39(2).
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant under Section
78-27-39.
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault attributable to each defendant, the fact finder may,
and when requested by a party shall, consider
the conduct of any person who contributed to the
alleged injury regardless of whether the person is
a person immune from suit or a defendant in the
action and may allocate fault to each person
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any
person immune from suit who contributed to the
alleged injury.
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune
from suit is considered only to accurately determine the fault of the person seeking recovery and
a defendant and may not subject the person immune from suit to any liability, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
1994
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts o n total
d a m a g e s a n d proportion of fault.
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of
damages sustained and the percentage or proportion
of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery,
to each defendant, and to any person immune from
suit who contributed to the alleged injury.
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to all persons immune from suit
is less than 40%, the trial court shall reduce that
percentage or proportion of fault to zero and reallocate that percentage or proportion of fault to
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1 If or it. You are not bound by such an opinion.

]

Give it th

2 height you think it deserves. If you should decide that the)
3 opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficients
4 education and experience, or if you should conclude that the
5 [reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, orj
6 that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may]
7 (disregard the opinion entirely.

8 I
9

Instruction No. 15:
Certain charts and summaries have been shown to you, oin

10 Iwill be shown to you, in order to help explain the facts
11 disclosed by the books, records, and other documents which
12 pre not in evidence in the case.

However, such charts or

13 summaries are not in and of themselves evidence or proof ofl
14 any facts.

If such charts or summaries do not correctly]

15 reflect facts or figures shown by the evidence in the case,
16 |you should disregard them.

Instruction No. 16:

17
18

A fact may be

proved

by circumstantial

evidence,

19 fcircumstantial evidence consists of facts or circumstances)
20 that give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the)
21 (facts sought to be proved.
22
23

Instruction No. 17:
Blanding City is subject to liability for physical hard

24 baused to Melvin Laws by a dangerous condition at tha
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1 Blanding City Dump if, but only if, Blanding City (a) knevj
2 pf the dangerous condition or by the exercise of reasonable^
3 bare should have discovered the dangerous condition, and
4 should have realized that the dangerous condition involved
5 an unreasonable risk of harm to Melvin Laws, and (b) should
6 expect that Mel Laws will not discover or realize the danger]
7 pr would

fail to protect himself

against

it, and

(c)

8 Blanding City then failed to exercise reasonable care toj
9 protect Melvin Laws from the dangerous condition-

io |

Reasonable care is what an ordinary, prudent persorJ

n

(uses in similar situations.

12
13
14
15
16

Instruction No. 18:

The amount of care that is|

considered reasonable depends on the situation.

You must]

pecide what a prudent person with similar knowledge would dd
p.n a similar situation.

Negligence may arise in acting or]

{failing to act.

Instruction No. 19:

17
18

Approximate cause of an injury is that cause which inl

19 [natural and continuous sequence produces the injury and
20 Without

which

the

injury

would

not

have

occurred

21 approximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors]
22 [that accomplish the injury.
23
24
Jc^z Musselman
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Instruction No. 20
If you find that the defendant, that's Blanding City,
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